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TIPPER CREDIBILITY, NONINFORMATIONAL
TIPPEE TRADING, AND ABSTENTION FROM
TRADING: AN ANALYSIS OF GAPS IN THE
INSIDER TRADING LAWS
Steven R. Salbu*
Abstract: The regulation of insider trading in the United States prohibits only a fraction of
the kind of behaviors which the Securities and Exchange Commission sought to curb in
the 1930s. This Article explains the problems created by trading on tipper credibility and
noninformation, as well as the difficulties associated with insider abstention from trading.
These practices are conceptually akin to trading on inside information, yet they fall
beyond the purview of existing prohibitions. The Article examines potential vehicles for
rendering the regulations more consistent, including authorization of all insider trading,
policing of information, the creation of inferences of fraud from circumstantial evidence,
the prohibition of entire classes of trades, and the application of a reduced threshold
"fraudulent scheme" concept to trigger liability in loophole cases.
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INTRODUCTION
Law reviews are cluttered with articles concerning insider trading
laws.1 Legal scholars have analyzed the purposes and applications of
Securities Acts and Exchange Acts,2 most notably the Securities Act
1. See infra notes 2, 6-8. These references are intended to be illustrative of a vast body of
literature regarding insider trading.
2. See, e.g., David J. Guin & David R. Donaldson, The Insider Tradng and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act: Has Congress Supplied a Limitations Period Appropriale for Use in Private lOb-
5 Actions?, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 541 (1990); Peter J. Henning, Between Chiarella and
Congress: A Guide to the Private Cause of Action for Insider Trading Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 39 KAN. L. REV. 1 (1990); Jerry W. Markham, "Front-running'"--Insider Trading Under
the Commodity Exchange Act, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 69 (1988); Marleen A. O'Connor, Toward a
More Efficient Deterrence of Insider Trading: The Repeal of Section 16(b), 58 FORDHAM L.
REviEw 309 (1989); S.S. Samuelson, The Prevention of Insider Trading. A Proposal for Revising




of 1933,' the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,4 the Commodities
Exchange Act,5 and applicable state laws.6 Scholars have interpreted
the rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) under the federal acts,7 and have made all manner of policy
recommendations to Congress, the SEC, and the courts.' Behind the
suggestions lie efforts at statutory construction, both historic and con-
temporary, as well as theoretical analysis from the fields of economics,
ethics, and law. While the securities laws have been subject to minor
modifications since their legislative inception in the 1930s, they remain
essentially intact today. Yet something crucial is missing from the
analysis: we have failed to address some evasive tactics that are seem-
ingly immune from the law in its current configuration. In the pages
that follow, I will attempt to persuade the reader that only a fraction
of those who seek to exploit what I shall term "inside advantage" are
dissuaded from doing so under existing law. Implicit in this statement
is an assumption that use of inside advantage may be rampant, and
that unlawful incidents of insider trading may form only a tiny frac-
tion of a much larger sphere of undesirable behavior. In section I, I
discuss the problem of insider abuse as it is currently addressed by
existing insider trading laws. Section II describes the forms of inside
advantage that are not technically insider trading and which, there-
fore, circumvent the reach of our present laws. Section III discusses
3. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-7811 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
5. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2-26 (1982 & Supp. 11 1990).
6. See, eg., Christopher J. Bebel & Kenneth C. Vert, State Takeover Laws, Insider Trading,
and the Interplay Between the Two: A New Perspective, 91 W. VA. L. REv. 1001 (1989); Don
Berger, Issuer Recovery of Insider Trading Profits Under Section 25502.5 of the California
Corporation Code, 21 PAC. L.J. 221 (1990).
7. See, e-g., Gregory S. Crespi, The Availability After Carpenter of Private Rights of Action
Under Rule 1Ob-5 Based Upon the Misappropriation of Information Concerning Acquisitions, 26
AM. Bus. L.J. 709 (1988); Willis W. Hagen II, Insider Trading Under Rule 10b-5: The
Theoretical Bases for Liability, 44 Bus. LAw. 13 (1988); David M. Phillips, An Essay: Six
Competing Currents of Rule 10b-5 Jurisprudence, 21 IND. L. REv. 625 (1988); Steve Thel, The
Genius of Section 16: Regulating the Management of Publicly Held Companies, 42 HASTINGS L.J.
391 (1991).
8. See, eg., H. Ward Classen, Basic, Inc., v. Levinson: Is Silence Really Golden?, 23 WAKE
FORESr L. REV. 607 (1988); Richard J. Hunter, Jr. & Philip Frese, The Genesis of an Ethical
Imperative: The SEC in Transition, 25 GONZ. L. Rnv. 9 (1989-90); Gary Lawson, The Ethics of
Insider Trading, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 727 (1988); Saul Levmore, In Defense of the
Regulation of Insider Trading, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101 (1988); Bill Shaw, Shareholder
Authorized Inside Trading: A Legal and Moral Analysis, 9 J. Bus. ETHics 913 (1990); Roman
Tomasic & Brendan Pentony, Insider Trading and Business Ethics, 13 LEGAL STUD. F. 151
(1989); Jonathan R. Macey, Comment, Ethics, Economics, and Insider Trading: Ayn Rand Meets
the Theory of the Firm, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 785 (1988).
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the feasibility and potential effectiveness of several proposed solutions.
The conclusion provides comments of synthesis.
I. THE CURRENT REGULATORY APPROACH TO THE
PROBLEM OF INSIDER TRADING
Under our current regulatory approach, insider trading is prohib-
ited as a form of fraud.9 The elements of fraud are intent, misrepre-
sentation of fact, materiality of the fact misrepresented, reliance on the
misrepresentation by the defrauded party,1° and injury.'" Because
insider trading has been prohibited indirectly, subsumed within fraud
rather than attacked explicitly, the impact of both common law1 2 and
regulation'" on insider trading has been limited. The scope of our cur-
rent approach to insider trading covers only a small fraction of the
behaviors that are objectionable. The discussion that follows identifies
the extent and limitations of coverage under our present regulatory
system.
A. Liability Requires a Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Liability for silent trading is predicated upon a breach of a fiduciary
duty. The execution of a trade breaching the duty constitutes fraud,
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992). Rule 10b-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice tc defraud, (b) To make
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
10. The reliance requirement has been somewhat relaxed in recent securities fraud cases,
partially because it is difficult for a trader to prove that she would have acted differently in
absence of the misrepresentation. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (creating a
rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation as part of a defrauded
market); Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1972)
(dispensing with proof of the reliance element). Likewise, the requirement that the plaintiff prove
a causal nexus between the defendant's act and the plaintiff's ostensible injury has been eroded
over the years. By statutory provision, those who trade contemporaneously against the
defendant in the relevant shares have a civil cause of action, provided they can prove the basic
elements of fraud apart from specific causality. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter ITSFEA].
11. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 525 (1977).
12. Under the common law, a special relationship between parties was found to create an
obligation to divulge inside information to the party to whom a duty was owed, or else to abstain
from trading on that information. See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
13. See sources cited supra notes 3-4.
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which is prohibited by rule lOb-5 as promulgated under the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934." Trading on nonpublic information is
unlawful under the rule only if the trading constitutes fraud. 5
Whereas cases through the 1960s essentially construed all trades made
on inside information, regardless of the source, to constitute fraud,' 6
criticism in the 1970s pressured the courts to scrutinize allegations
more rigorously for the elements of fraud before establishing liabil-
ity.' 7 Where there is no express misrepresentation,"8 the fraud must
be inferred from the act of silently trading despite a fiduciary duty
either to disclose the relevant information or to abstain from dealing in
the relevant securities.' 9 Under this approach, misappropriation of
information rather than inequality of information is the prohibited
force.20 A corporate insider, owing a fiduciary duty to the company
that employs him, is bound by the duty to abstain from trading on
nonpublic information. 2' A corporate outsider, such as a lawyer,
accountant, consultant, or underwriter,22 may be characterized as a
"temporary insider," and thereby be bound by the same fiduciary
duties as an insider.23 Even an outsider who does not qualify as a
temporary insider may nonetheless be held liable for trading on non-
public information if the trade is in contravention of a fiduciary duty
which the outsider owes to another.24 An outsider or a temporary
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
15. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
16. See, eg., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub
noma. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
17. See, eg., Neil S. Cross & David S. Ruder, Limitations on Civil Liability Under Rule lob-5,
1972 DUKE L.J. 1128, 1132 (suggesting that civil compensation be limited to parties injured by
fraud and covered by privity of contract, and not extended to all simultaneous traders). But see
Louis Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1827-29 (2d ed. 1961) (observing the benefit of having
the SEC litigate claims to protect an ostensibly large number of victims who suffer from an
incident of insider trading).
18. This condition encompasses virtually all insider trading cases. Because the trades are
made over anonymous securities markets, buyers and sellers seldom make any representations at
all regarding the securities being transferred.
19. Fraud via misappropriation does not require that the breach of duty be directed to the
shareholders of the stock being traded. Fraud can be inferred as well in cases of
misappropriation from non-shareholder parties, such as one's employer. See, e.g., SEC v.
Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
20. The nature of the misappropriation requirement is discussed in detail in several recent
cases. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 245 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Moss v. Newman,
465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
21. See cases cited supra note 20.
22. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
23. SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397, 1402-03 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
24. See supra note 19.
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insider is liable for trading on inside information only if he owes a
fiduciary duty to another, either by virtue of a special relationship
thereto, or derived from a tipper of information.25 The fiduciary duty
requirement for insider trading liability reflects the Supreme Court's
growing tendency to view the function of rule lCb-5 as protection
against micro-transactional fraud rather than preservation of generic,
macro-level market integrity.2 6 While the nature of the unfair advan-
tage held by insiders, temporary insiders, and outsiders may be indis-
tinguishable, their liability for trading on that advantage varies
dramatically, based on differences in the obligations they owe to the
owners of the information.27
B. Liability Requires the Existence of Inside Information
Because fraud requires an express or implied misrepresentation of
material fact,28 insider trading claims based on fraud must be predi-
cated on the utilization of factual information. Fratud does not exist
when the misrepresentation is one of opinion rather than one of fact.29
Virtually all recent insider trading cases entail transactions based on
factual information, rather than on hints or suggestions of tacit or
latent advantage.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,3" for example, concerned trading on
information regarding the discovery of ore at a company drilling site.
Chiarella v. United States31 involved information concerning planned
tender offers. Although the prospective acquisitions were speculative
25. See SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984). One who inadvertently
overhears inside information in a public place is not liable for trading on that information,
because the inadvertent inside tipper is benefited neither directly nor indirectly from the
disclosure. Id. at 766. But see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1991) (forbidding trades by those in
possession of nonpublic information of a tender offer, even if derived only indirectly from an
insider).
26. For a discussion of the shortcomings of this approach, and the value of applying the
federal securities laws to the maintenance of the integrity of national markets, see Dennis S.
Kaijala, Federalism, Full Disclosure, and the National Markets in the Interpretation of Federal
Securities Law, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1473, 1487 (1986), observing as a general principle:
To the extent federal law explicitly governs disclosure and/or substantive behavior in
specific transactions, such as public offerings, proxy solicitations, and tender offers, courts
should attempt to determine the federal policy or purpose underlying the statute or
administrative regulation and to implement that policy or purpose without appeal to general
principles of either federalism or full disclosure.
27. For a critique of this phenomenon, see Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal
Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic Information, 73 GEo. L.J. 1083 1985).
28. RE STATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 525 (1977).
29. Id. § 538A.
30. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
31. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Chiarella was exonerated because he was neither an insider nor a
tippee owing a fiduciary duty not to trade. I cite this case here not as eidence of liability, but as
Vol. 68:307, 1993
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at the time of trading, the existence of the proposals themselves was
factual in nature. Perhaps the farthest a court has gone in stretching
the "factual information" element of fraud concerned the prosecution
of R. Foster Winans and stockbrokers at Kidder Peabody.32 Winans
revealed to the brokers the content and publication dates of future
articles he wrote to appear in the "Heard on the Street" column of The
Wall Street Journal.33 Although the content of the articles was com-
prised of Winans' opinions, the district court viewed the details of
their prospective publication as both material and factual,34 finding a
rule lOb-5 violation.3" While the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed this decision, 6 the Supreme Court was split on the issue of
insider trading, limiting its finding of liability to the related issue of
mail fraud.37  The dates and content of future publications, while
clearly factual in nature, are probably on the extreme end of what is
likely to comprise factual information as required for a finding of
fraudulent misrepresentation under rule lOb-5. There are apparently
no cases to date in which a defendant has been held accountable for
trading on opinions or credibility, even if the tip of opinion or credibil-
ity has been founded on undisclosed inside information.
C. Liability Requires a Transaction
Rule lOb-5 prohibits fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security."38 The court in Chiarella thus observed, "liability is
premised on a duty to disclose which arises from a relationship of trust
and confidence between parties to a transaction."39 Because the grava-
men of insider trading claims is fraud rather than the act of insider
trading per se, liability focuses on injury sustained by a party in the
process of a transaction, rather than market disintegration that may
another example of a baseline requirement of factual information to support prosecution under
the current insider trading regulations.
32. The pre-publication views to be contained in a Wall Street Journal investment column
were viewed as opinions. The future publication of the information in the columns was viewed as
factual, and as material in its impact upon market activity. United States v. Winans, 612 F.
Supp. 827, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), afl'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. Carpenter,
791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), affld, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
33. Id. at 833-35.
34. Id. at 830.
35. Id. at 849.
36. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming rationale of district
court but reversing conviction of Winans for conspiracy), affig in part United States v. Winans,
612 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), af'd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
37. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (4-4 decision).
38. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
39. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (emphasis added).
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result from wrongful but non-transactional behavior on the part of the
defendant.4°
The transaction threshold for rule lOb-5 liability began as a privity
requirement, borne of a post-Texas Gulf Sulphur41 desire to interpret
the rule literally and conservatively.42 Under common law, the ele-
ment of fraud in rule lOb-5 should consist of an intentional misrepre-
sentation, including silence when under a duty to speak, upon which
the opposing party relies to her detriment in entering the transac-
tion.43 The element of inducement to enter a contractual transaction
has traditionally been an essential element of the cause of action in
fraud,' so that the securities laws derived thereunder focus on insider
trading rather than insider decisions not to trade.
Given that the concept of fraud is derived from the law of contract
and focuses on amelioration of deficiencies in inducement or execution
of a transaction, the recent emphasis on privity is not surprising.
Unfortunately, while the courts are restricting themselves under the
guise of stricter statutory construction, they exacerbate the difficulties
associated with tying a cause of action to an inappropriate doctrine of
law.4 5 Fraud is and always has been an inadequate aid obliquely fash-
40. See Jeffrey P. Strickler, Note, Inside Information and Outside Traders: Corporate Recovery
of the Outsider's Unfair Gain, 73 CAL. L. REv. 483, 510 (1985) (observing that rule lOb-5
liability focuses on the plaintiff's injury rather than the defendant's wrongful behavior).
41. I refer here to the Supreme Court's attempts in the 1980s to scrutinize insider trading
claims carefully for the elements of fraud. For more detailed discussion of this trend, see Steven
R. Salbu, Regulation of Insider Trading in a Global Marketplac" A Uniform Statutory Approach,
66 TUL. L. REV. 837, 843-46 (1992).
42. See Douglas M. Branson, Prescience and Vindication: Federal Courts, SEC Rule 10b-5,
and the Work of David S. Ruder, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 613, 620-21 (1991) (discussing the
tendency of more lenient federal courts in the 1950s through the 1970k to permit "recovery in
cases in which privity could not exist for the reason that the defendant, usually a corporate issuer
of shares, had not engaged in any securities transaction whatsoever").
43. See RErSATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
44. The elements of privity and transaction have begun to separate as threshold rule lOb-5
requirements. While a transaction is still a necessary component of a private claim, the privity
requirement has been substantially eroded by statutory contemporanecus trader standing, and
the fraud on the market theory. Under the ITSFEA, those who have traded simultaneously and
in the opposite direction of a defrauding party can sue that party without proving privity of
contract. See sources cited supra note 10. The fraud on the market theory has also attenuated the
privity element by creating a rebuttable presumption that all contemporaneous traders have
relied on a misrepresentation, because that misrepresentation defrauds the entire market
mechanism. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). The fraud on the market theory
has been criticized for imposing excessive costs on investors. See Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution
Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623 (1992).
45. Transactional causality and privity of contract have also been difficult logistical issues in
the prosecution of insider trading cases because the anonymous marketplace depersonalizes
exchanges. This is in part a justification for allowing civil claims to be made by all




ioned avenue for addressing the inequities and inefficiencies that result
from unfair utilization of information." If the law were concerned
strictly with the fairness of securities markets, it would consider non-
transactional inequities to be as compelling as those that result in a
transaction.47 This is because pecuniary advantage resulting from an
inside trade is conceptually indistinguishable from the financial
rewards resulting from inside decisions to hold stocks or refrain from
purchasing stocks.48 Yet the requirements of fraud restrict the law's
ability to regulate the latter forms of abuse.4 9
II. THE INADEQUACY OF EXISTING REGULATORY
POLICY
The approach to regulating insider trading discussed in the prior
section has been criticized and evaluated on many levels." Critics
have generally restricted themselves to assessing the laws and regula-
tions in existence, recommending minor changes rather than substan-
tial modification which questions the entire approach. 1 In other
words, the insider trading laws are ordinarily evaluated in terms of
their effectiveness at thwarting the occurrence of trades made on mis-
appropriated, nonpublic information. In accepting this framing of the
problem as a starting point, we have circumvented important issues
which have been implicitly resolved in the very process of framing.
We assume that a misappropriation must exist in order for an outsider
to be held liable for misconduct,52 and that some form of factual infor-
mation must be held by the defendant to establish culpability. 3 By
accepting the judicial framing of the problem and working within that
framework, we have allowed our scholarship to be funnelled into the
evaluation of prefabricated issues. If we take a step back, we shall find
46. For a discussion of the inadequacy of fraud as the means of monitoring insider trading,
see Steven R. Salbu, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading: A Legal, Economic, and
Ethical Analysis, 15 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 223 (1992).
47. See infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
49. In particular, the elements of causality and reliance prove intractable in regard to
abstention from activity.
50. See sources cited supra notes 2, 6-8.
51. The notable exception is the body of scholarship recommending the abolition of all
regulation of insider trading. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, In Defense of Insider Trading, 44
HARV. Bus. REV. 113 (1966). Those scholars who believe in the ethical and economic
justifications for regulation tend to limit their analyses to tinkering with small questions of
statutory or regulatory interpretation or policy.
52. See supra notes 14-27 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
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that the framing of the legal issues has masked some crucial problems
regarding exploitation of inside advantage.
Because I have addressed in detail the shortcomings of the misap-
propriation requirement in previous articles,54 I shall restrict my dis-
cussion here to a different set of regulatory imperfections. In
particular, rule lOb-5 creates by omission a number of technicalities
through which the rule's spirit and essential purpose can be circum-
vented while a trader remains technically within the bounds of the
law.5" These holes in our current regulatory approach are important
for two reasons. First, they suggest that the effectiveness of our insider
trading prohibitions is greatly overestimated, targeting only a fraction
of the types of activities that can create market unfairness and ineffi-
ciencies. This deficiency may be self-perpetuating, as the misguided
complacency engendered by the sense that we have already addressed
the problem encourages us to reduce our vigilance. Second, as pro-
spective participants in securities markets become more aware of the
tactics available for evasion of civil and criminal sanctions, existing
laws will become increasingly ineffective and irrelevant. We are likely
to witness a growing reliance on the technical means of avoiding liabil-
ity as market players become more aware of their options.
Three important gaps in our regulation of insider trading are cov-
ered in this section: trading on tipper credibility, trading on
noninformation, and abstention from trading. The problems associ-
ated with credibility and noninformational tipping are a function of
the non-finite nature of information, which falls along a continuum
from highly definitive to highly vague,56 and the difficulties associated
with monitoring and regulating these varying degrees of information.
Abstention from trading is troublesome because, although inactivity is
beyond the technical purview of fraud, decisions to refrain from trad-
54. See Steven R. Salbu, A Critical Analysis of Misappropriation Theory in Insider Trading
Cases, 2 Bus. ETHICS Q. 465 (1992); Steven R. Salbu, A Legal and Economic Analysis of Insider
Trading: Establishing an Appropriate Sphere of Regulation, 8 Bus. & PROF. ETHICS J. 2 (1990).
55. The inadequacy of rule lOb-5 in inhibiting abusive practices may be in large part a
function of unnecessarily restrictive application. While the judicial trend favors narrow
interpretation of the rule, there is evidence that Congress intended, in the enabling language of
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, to grant the SEC substantially greater power than it currently
wields. For a detailed discussion of the purposes of Congress in drafting section 10(b), see Steve
Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. Rv.
385 (1990).
56. Thus, for example, the problem of rumors, and the effect of speculative information on
market efficiency, has proved to be a thorny one. See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Rumor Control
and Disclosure of Merger Negotiations or Other Control-related Transactions: Full Disclosure or




ing based on inside information are no more equitable than decisions
to trade using that information.
A. Trading on Tipper Credibility
A tip, in the broad sense of the word, is simply advice given by one
person to another to buy or sell a particular security at a particular
time.57 Under this definition, a tipper can develop the proclivity for or
against a particular security either professionally or nonprofession-
ally,5 8 and on the basis of inside information, public information, or
both. A tippee who receives a tip to buy or sell the relevant security
must, like any investor, assess the risk of the transaction, which will be
partially a function of the tipper's credibility. A tip based on inside
information is rationally advantageous if the tippee believes that the
product of two elements-inside advantage and the likelihood of tip
validity- outweigh the advantage obtained by that tippee's customary
research. Since inside advantage is always valuable in markets driven
by information, tipper credibility can be the crucial factor in a tippee's
market decision.
While nonprofessional tippers are unlikely to have systematic access
to inside information, professional tippers routinely obtain many bits
of information, large and small, important and irrelevant, both publi-
cized and confidential. The fact that professionals invariably receive
nonpublic information forms a component of their credibility. Thus, a
"bald tip"-a tip given by a professional with absolutely no justifica-
tion-has the invisible power of potential insider information behind
it. The tippee who has technically received no information from the
bald tip has, nonetheless, received the laundered benefit of publicly
unavailable information, the type of advantage which our laws other-
wise attempt to eliminate. The tippee who trades on credibility com-
prised partly of inside information has probably not violated our
present insider trading laws, yet his trade is fundamentally at odds
with the ethical concerns those laws ostensibly address.
To understand how tippees trading on credibility can evade liability
for insider trading, we must examine existing legal restraints upon tip-
57. I am intentionally using an extremely broad definition of tipping here, in order to
distinguish later between tipping of inside information and tipping without divulgence of inside
information. Some definitions of a tippee are more specific, and stipulate that a tip contains
inside information. See, eg., WILLIS W. HAGEN II & GORDON H. JOHNSON, DIGEST OF
BUSINESS LAW 236 (3d ed. 1986) (defining a tippee as the recipient of material nonpublic
information).
58. The professionals most likely to have access to inside information include directors,
officers, and managers of the firm at issue, as well as securities analysts, investment bankers, and
attorneys who deal in securities or mergers and acquisitions.
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pee trading, as well as their limitations. Under the present approach, a
tippee is liable for insider trading only if (a) the tipper had a fiduciary
duty appurtenant to the owner of the relevant information,59 (b) the
tipper breached that duty by knowingly divulging the information to
the tippee,6° and (c) the tippee knowingly traded upon that informa-
tion.61 Under this three prong test, a tippee can avoid liability in sev-
eral ways.
If a tipper acts in good faith, unaware that the tippee will use the
information to trade, then the tipper has not breached his duty.62
Unless the tippee qualifies as a temporary insider under SEC v.
Lund,63 by virtue of a "special relationship with the corporation,"
the breach of duty must be derived from the tipper.65 Even though the
tippee evinces bad faith, he will be exonerated from liability in the
event of a technical failure in tracing to the tipper a breach of duty.66
If the tippee has not received the underlying information, but is sim-
ply the beneficiary of the tipper's credibility, which includes generic
access to nonpublic information, the tippee will lack the scienter
required as an element of fraud.67 Moreover, in orde:r for the tipper to
have breached his or her fiduciary duty, it is necessary that the tipper
have received some personal benefit, direct or indirect, from the disclo-
59. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). Under Dirks, a tippee's duty to disclose inside
information or abstain from trading is derived from the duty of the tipper. The Court observes
that the obligation to refrain from trading on inside information must be based on a fiduciary
duty, and is not derived from one's mere "ability to acquire information because of [one's]
position in the market." Id. at 657-58. The derivative duty requirement of tippee liability
prohibits tippee trading only in instances wherein the tipper had a legal obligation to disclose the
information or abstain from trading.
60. Id.; see also ITSFEA, supra note 10. The ITSFEA extended the power of Dirks by
establishing the liability of those who control tippers by passing information to them which the
tippers in turn deliver to trading tippees. while the ITSFEA suggests that the chain of liability
can extend among numerous links in the tipping process which leads n the eventual trade, it
does not dispense with the usual scienter requirements.
61. See In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 643 (1971) (creating a duty to
disclose information or abstain from trading if the tippee "knew or had reason to know the
information was nonpublic and had been obtained improperly by selective revelation or
otherwise").
62. United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985).
63. 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (holding a tippee to be a temporary insider regarding
information he received for a legitimate purpose from the relevant firm's chief executive officer).
64. Id. at 1403.
65. See Reed, 601 F. Supp at 696.
66. Id. at 699.
67. Scienter requires intent to deceive. For a discussion of the scienter requirement in insider
trading cases, see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195-97 (1976) (emphasizing the
statutory language of section 10(b), which prohibits manipulation or deception, therein
suggesting a scienter requirement).
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sure.68 In Dirks v. SEC,69 the Supreme Court identified two situations
in which this requisite benefit exists: (a) when the tipper expects com-
pensation from the tippee, 70 and (b) when the tip, even if made with-
out expectation of compensation, is given to a friend or relative.71
This creates a situation in which tips received for consideration com-
prise a breach of fiduciary duty, whereas gratuitous tips that do not
indirectly benefit the tipper fail to establish the requisite breach from
which tippee liability might be derived.
Both tips that gain their value from generic credibility and tips
given without consideration will confer substantial, unilateral benefit 72
upon the tippee if they are supported by inside information. The bene-
fit is unilateral because its access is not universally shared within the
market. The trades that result are made upon asymmetric informa-
tion, yielding potential inefficiencies and inequities.7 While the
results are precisely the variety intended to be proscribed by rule lOb-
5, they are lawful based on technicality of definition.74
In many instances, tips based on credibility rather than explicit
information arguably confer indirect as well as direct benefit upon the
tipper. I refer here specifically to the credibility of investment profes-
sionals, whose future business prospects are indirectly enhanced when
their generic (as well as information-specific) recommendations prove
successful to clients. Added to the compensation they receive for their
services, professional investment advisors clearly meet the personal
benefit test of Dirks.75 Yet even if the benefit test is thus met, insuper-
able obstacles to both tipper and tippee liability often remain. The
tippee cannot be held liable because the investment advice is generic
rather than information-specific. While the tippee understands that
there is a wealth of both public and inside information behind a
sophisticated analyst's recommendations, he or she becomes insulated
from liability because the scienter requirement76 cannot be met when
68. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983).
69. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
70. See id. at 664.
71. Id.
72. I define a "unilateral benefit" as an informational advantage, based on information either
explicitly or implicitly disclosed to the tippee, obtained by the tippee but not generally available
to the public.
73. For a discussion of the effects of information asymmetry on market efficiency and
fairness, see Salbu, supra note 46.
74. I have addressed this shortcoming of our existing insider trading laws in an earlier work.
See id.
75. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 67.
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the tippee is intentionally denied the background information implicit
in the tip.77
If a professional tipper is held to have received a benefit in the form
of present and future consideration for services rendered, he or she is
liable under the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement
Act of 1988 (ITSFEA)78 for the tippee's profits, as long as the tipper's
generic tip was predicated on actual inside information sufficient to
establish the breach of fiduciary duty necessary under the misappro-
priation test.7 9 Unfortunately, as we shall observe in the following sec-
tion, professional investment analysts often receive "noninformation"
tips which, while conferring significant advantage, are sufficiently
vague to suggest a lack of scienter in originating the tip.
B. Trading on Noninformation
In this section, I address insider advantages that consist of some-
thing less than factual information, such as factual suspicions,
shrouded or veiled information, and sensations comm.unicated without
language but rather by attitude, implication, enthusiasm, or a figura-
tive wink. The section begins with a discussion of stock analysts' priv-
ileged relations with corporate insiders, and the opportunities they
have for receiving noninformational advantage. This discussion is fol-
lowed by an explanation of the economic and ethical problems that
arise from such noninformational trading. The analysis culminates in
an assertion and defense of the proposition that informational and
noninformational insider trading are indistinguishable on principle
and should therefore be treated, to whatever extent possible, as like
cases under the law.
The Dirks tipper liability standard, which requires that the tipper
expect to receive a personal benefit in order to be held liable for tippee
trades under rule lOb-5, allows corporate agents to disclose informa-
tion selectively to stock analysts.80 Professor Langevoort observes, "if
the reason for an insider's disclosure to an analyst is to serve some
corporate end, such as to enhance the company's standing with the
investor community or to strengthen pre-existing lines of communica-
77. While the exoneration of tippee liability is rational under our current system, it highlights
a problem in that system itself. Those investors who can afford the "best" advising, often a
euphemistically shrouded reference to the best inside-connected advice, are conferred with an
advantage over those who do not have such access.
78. ITSFEA, supra note 10.
79. See id.
80. See Donald C. Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the Law of insider Trading, 76 VA.




tion, liability apparently will not follow."'" Likewise, the ITSFEA's
extension of liability to those who control tippers12 does not prohibit
communications between corporate insiders and stock analysts.8 3
Corporate insiders, permitted to divulge information selectively to
investment analysts, 4 have strong incentives to do so. A company's
financial public relations officers are evaluated directly on the quality
of analysts' reports regarding the company's past performance and
future prospects, as well as indirectly on the basis of stock prices as
they presumably incorporate public perceptions created by these ana-
lysts. Under either assessment criterion, the performance of financial
public relations personnel is closely tied to the cultivation of effective
relationships with professional analysts. The latter group, knowing
they wield significant power over public relations representatives,
receive several forms of hidden advantage as the insiders try to culti-
vate their good will.8 5
Consider, for example, the following hypothetical. Quality Corpo-
ration's financial agent is aware of an important technological discov-
ery resulting from recent in-house research that has been executed sub
rosa. Agent receives a telephone call from an investment analyst at
Analco, a premier group of securities analysts. Analyst wants infor-
mation regarding the present health and the future prospects of Qual-
ity. The agent is likely to (i) discuss explicitly only publicly available
information, and (ii) evaluate that information as well as publicly
unavailable information based on experience and expertise. Perhaps
performance has been poor for several years, and the agent may indi-
rectly suggest that this year's income statement will be typically unim-
pressive.86  Last year, prior to the technological discovery, Agent
81. Id. at 1024.
82. See ITSFEA, supra note 10.
83. See HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, INSIDER TRADING AND SECURMES
FRAUD ENFORCEMENT Acr OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043. According to the House report, the ITSFEA was not
intended to "inhibit honest communication between corporate officials and securities analysts."
Id. at 19, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6056.
84. See Langevoort, supra note 80, at 1023-24.
85. While the courts have not attempted to address problems associated with the systematic
asymmetrical access to information held by professionals, they are aware that investment
professionals regularly gain access to inside advantage that is not shared with the public at large.
Thus, the court in Dirks observed, "It is commonplace for analysts to 'ferret out and analyze
information' . . . by meeting with and questioning corporate officers and others who are
insiders. . . . [S]uch information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of the
corporation's stockholders or the public generally." Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658-59 (1983).
86. Corporate financial public relations agents face pressures to be somewhat candid, even
regarding bad news. Because financial analysts are powerful, corporate agents are reluctant to
deceive them, even when this reluctance compels admission of poor performance.
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projected to Analyst a realistic sense of hope regaxding future per-
formance, significantly constrained by knowledge of pending annual
report data.87 This year, while the insider is constrained by a real need
for confidentiality as well as an understanding of the nature of the
securities laws, the spirit8 8 of the new discovery is clearly com-
municated.
A corporate insider with a reputation for sober restraint and aver-
sion to hyperbole can easily convince the analyst community that
something special is about to happen, without actually revealing any
real information. I refer to this communication of enthusiasm as the
conveyance of "noninformation" 9 because, although an important,
informed, and accurate sense of the company's destiay has been trans-
mitted, there is no hook upon which to hang prospective liability for
insider trading. While the analyst and her clients benefit from the
communication, there is no locus for liability under our present regu-
latory scheme. The corporate insider, the only pa.-ty with sufficient
information to meet a scienter requirement, is not constrained by
either Dirks or the ITSFEA from communicating either information
or noninformation to investment analysts.90 Both the analyst and the
analyst's clients are insulated from liability, because no information
has passed and thereby been misappropriated, and. because without
real information, the analyst and client lack scienter. The result is that
the analyst benefits in terms of deserved reputation, and the analyst's
client benefits from gains connected to the noninformational advan-
tage, while the marketplace becomes increasingly characterized by
information asymmetry and systematic unfairness.
Critics who have challenged the need to restrain any kind of insider
trading would in all likelihood consider the noninformational variety
to be especially innocuous. Scholars have argued in general that
87. At first glance it may seem beneficial for such agents always to convey a prognosis as
optimistically inflated as possible, yet there are countervailing incentives to convey accurate
rather than acritically sanguine projections. Most crucially, investment analysts have a large
stake in receiving accurate, rather than whitewashed, information. When their need for accuracy
is communicated to corporate insiders, coupled with the power implicit 7n the overall favorability
of their reports, insiders are motivated to develop a reputation over time for reliability.
88. I distinguish the spirit of facts from the facts themselves, the former being a distillation of
the latter sufficiently vague to be considered an attitude or posture rather than either a fact or an
opinion.
89. The distinction between information and noninformation is one of degree, and there are
varieties of disclosure that do not clearly fit into either category. See James D. Cox, Insider
Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the "Chicago School," 1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 636
(noting the possibility of "[a]mbiguous corporate disclosures and signals," which can be used not
only to convey inside information, but to create opportunity for manipulative practices).
90. See sources cited supra notes 83-85.
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insider trading enhances market efficiency by expediting the incorpo-
ration of true information into the pricing mechanism.91 Some have
suggested the utility of insider information as managerial emolument
under varying conditions,92 and others contend that no one is injured
when a person trades on publicly unavailable information.9 3 Those
who contend that trading on inside information is harmless for these
reasons are likely to object strenuously to the argument that trading
on noninformation creates either an ethical or an economic problem.
My response to skeptics is twofold: (1) Potential advantages of
insider trading are outweighed by real concerns regarding both ethics
and efficiency; (2) The insurmountable problems pertaining to insider
trading are as compelling in the case of trading on noninformation as
they are in the case of trading on information, because the two types of
insider trading are conceptually indistinguishable.
1. Potential Advantages of Insider Trading Are Outweighed by Real
Concerns Regarding Both Ethics and Efficiency
Ostensible advantages of allowing insider trading fall into two cate-
gories: market efficiency and managerial incentive. Neither of these
advantages is compelling in itself, and both are outweighed by negative
effects of insider trading.
91. For the classic discussion in this vein, see HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE
STOCK MARKET (1966). For a discussion of the relevance of market efficiency goals in the
development of securities laws in general and of insider trading regulations in particular, see
Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market
Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 613 (1988).
92. See MANNE, supra note 91, at 131-45 (suggesting that allowing corporate insiders to
trade on inside information can act as a managerial incentive); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R.
Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 857 (1983) (proposing that
permitting insider trading may help resolve agency conflicts that arise due to the separation of
ownership and control of corporations); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate
Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982) (recognizing insider trading as a form of reward).
93. See, eg., Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REv.
1, 31 (1980) ("It is difficult ... to draw a convincing, or even plausible, causal connection
between... insider trading and the market losses experienced by other investors."); Ralph K.
Winter, On "Protecting the Ordinary Investor," 63 WASH. L. REv. 881, 900 (1988) (suggesting
that insider trading is not unfair to ordinary investors, who "buy or sell according to current cash
position or need to change the ratio of various categories of investments in their portfolio").
Judge Winter's catalogue of motives for buying or selling seems incomplete. Those who decide
to enter a securities transaction because they incorrectly assess the prognosis for a given stock are
in fact at an unfair disadvantage in their dealings with those who have inside information. See
Iman Anabtawi, Note, Toward a Definition of Insider Trading, 41 STAN. L. REv. 377, 388
(1989):
Where managers are permitted to trade on information superior to that of shareholders,
shareholders will be systematically disadvantaged when trading the company's stock. On
average, shareholders will be net sellers to insiders whenever insiders know of an impending




The argument that insider trading improves market efficiency con-
tains several flaws. The essence of the argument is that all informed
trading, regardless of whether the information behind it is public, ren-
ders pricing in a large, anonymous marketplace more efficient by expe-
diting the assimilation of a maximum of relevant information.94 Yet
incremental gains in efficiency are likely to be overestimated in several
ways. First, such gains are only significant if the proportion of confi-
dential inside information relative to all information is significant. If
inside information forms a small fraction of all information, the effect
of such information on market efficiency will be diluted to the point of
insubstantiality.95 Secondly, the potential gain to b- made in permit-
ting such trades is further reduced by the fact that some insiders
choose to divulge information rather than abstain from trading. Those
who choose to divulge rather than abstain already confer efficiency
advantages upon the market, so that incremental gains in efficiency
attributable to allowing insider trading would likely be extremely
small.
Perhaps most importantly, even substantial gains in the market's
expedient assimilation of information must be considered in tandem
with countervailing negative effects of insider trading. Insider trading
reduces investor confidence, thereby reducing investor participation as
well.9 6 If prospective investors are driven from American securities
markets as a result of dissatisfaction with market inequities, loss of
demand will result in declining stock prices while loss of capitalization
will harm the growth potential of American industlies.97
b. Managerial Incentive
Permitting insider trading as a form of managerial emolument is
equally unpersuasive. Management is currently given sufficient or
even excessive incentive to remain in their jobs and to do them well. A
recent spate of criticism centers around these excesses in managerial
94. See sources cited supra note 91.
95. In defense of the practice of insider trading, it can be argued that the potential
participants form an insignificant number. This line of reasoning undermines market efficiency
arguments by implying that the crucial gains would be so small as to ccnfer little real benefit on
the free market. While small incidence of insider trading may have little effect on the efficiency
of the marketplace, it creates conditions of inequality and unfairness that are objectionable in
principle, regardless of the degree of pervasiveness of the practice.
96. See infra notes 117, 127.





compensation. 98  As activist shareholders have begun to place pres-
sures on their companies to curb compensation packages that are
either excessive or insufficiently tied to meaningful performance meas-
ures,9 9 executives have not retreated en masse from corporate
America."°° Annual pay packages upwards of seventy-five million
dollars in 1991 are apparently considered to be more than enough,101
so that the execution of a trend toward restraint is unlikely to affect
managerial incentive to remain in office or continue to operate as effec-
tively as always. At a more conservative margin, we could expect
executives to be motivated by the financial advantages conferred by
any pecuniary perquisite. But as high-level corporate management
salaries become severely inflated, providing a large margin of slack
beyond what is necessary to keep the best management, the marginal
utility of prospective pecuniary gain should decline and approach
zero, as non-pecuniary utilities dominate the motivation of
executives. 102
Of course, not all executives are overpaid, and it can be argued that
many are underpaid, especially since the excesses heralded in the pop-
ular press tend to focus on an elite corps of large companies that in
fact represent only a small fraction of American businesses."0 3 Yet
even in companies in which increased executive compensation may be
desirable, the provision of such compensation through insider trading
privileges is managerially irrational. It confers financial gain arbitrar-
ily, based on the sporadic and gratuitous receipt of valuable and secret
information. As Professor Cox has observed, "the manager's incen-
tives are hopelessly confused and certainly are not focused exclusively
98. See, eg., John A. Byrne et al., Executive Pay: Compensation at the Top Is Out of Control,
Bus. WK., Mar. 30, 1992, at 52.
99. Id.
100. While some pressures regarding CEO compensation have resulted in a steadying of
salaries and bonuses, CEO option grants are still growing. See Shawn Tully, Vhat CEOs Really
Make, FORTUNE, June 15, 1992, at 94.
101. See Maria Mallory, Tony O'Reilly: Turning Ketchup into Big Dough, Bus. WK., Mar. 30,
1992, at 58 (observing that Anthony O'Reilly of H.J. Heinz was the highest paid CEO in 1991,
receiving a total pay package of $75.1 million).
102. Apart from the economic concept of declining utilities, psychological attribution theory
suggests that excessive salaries should be ineffectual because at some point extrinsic rewards
simply displace effective, internally-generated sources of personal satisfaction. For a discussion
of the attribution theory from a managerial perspective, see Barry M. Staw & Jerry Ross,
Commitment in an Experimenting Society: An Experiment on the Attribution of Leadership from
Administrative Scenarios, 65 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 249 (1980).
103. See generally Mallory, supra note 101 (discussing compensation of the highest-paid
CEOs annually since the 1980s, including representatives of Federal Express, NCR, Mesa
Petroleum, DWG, Chrysler, Toys 'R' Us, Walt Disney, McCaw Cellular, UAL, and H.J. Heinz).
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upon the stockholders' interest. .. ." Compensation in the form of
whatever inside information happens to reach an executive is both
highly uncertain and disconnected to any meaningful performance
measures. A poorly performing executive may be richly rewarded
solely because he or she has had the good fortune to receive valuable
confidential information in the course of a particular year.
Apart from its motivational dysfunction, authorized insider trading
is likely to incur both opportunity and agency costs. Opportunity
costs arise as managers spend their time trying to cash in on their own
insider transactions. Agency costs are associated with this process as
the conflict of interest between work for self and work for shareholders
is heightened.10 5 Because ownership and control of corporations have
been separated in the professionalization of management, 0 6 executives
operating under conditions of relative autonomy have occasion to
engage in opportunistic behavior, creating value for themselves rather
than for shareholders. Unfortunately, a compensation scheme that
fails to tie executive payment with performance probably fails, in the
process, to monitor agency costs. Provision of fluctuating compensa-
tion based on activities unconnected with the creation of shareholder
value is likely to increase agency costs by encouraging self-serving
behavior not correlated to shareholder wealth. 10 7
Professors Carlton and Fischel suggest that managers need incen-
tives to overcome the tendency to risk-averse behavior, and that the
ability to turn corporate failure to personal gain through insider trad-
ing will encourage management to engage in some risky activities.108
While the prospect of personal insider trading profits may enhance the
attractiveness of risky activity, it does not necessarily follow that the
company will benefit as a result. Although American companies may
lose opportunities because of unnecessary risk aversion, 09 Carlton and
Fischel's prescription overshoots the mark. Allowing insiders to com-
104. Cox, supra note 89, at 651.
105. For a discussion of the nature of agency costs that are ass3ciated with professional
management, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
106. For the classic discussion of this phenomenon, see ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C.
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
107. See ALFRED RAPPAPORT, CREATING SHAREHOLDER VALUE: THE NEW STANDARD
FOR BUSINESS PERFORMANCE 6-9 (1986) ("Critics of large corporations often allege that
corporate managers have too much power and that they act in ways to benefit themselves at the
expense of shareholders and other corporate constituencies.").
108. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 92, at 873-76.
109. See Charles W.L. Hill et al., Declining US. Competitiveness: Reflections on a Crisis, 2
ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 51, 54-55 (1988) (discussing causes of risk avoidance and lack of




pensate risk-related losses through personal trading gain indiscrimi-
nately encourages all risk taking. Managers should not be encouraged
to take wildly speculative and foolhardy risks; rather, they should feel
comfortable taking intelligent, informed risks that may bear justifiable
rewards. It may well be true that current thresholds for intelligent
managerial risk assessment have been systematically rendered undesir-
ably low. The appropriate solutions to cultural and social forces that
discourage risk will be managerial solutions in which decision makers
better understand the ways in which to serve their businesses.110 To
encourage all manner of risk, and to base that encouragement in selfish
motives, will bring both desirable and undesirable risk taking, and is
likely to provide no net gain to the companies involved."'
Because inside information as emolument is not connected with
either the accomplishment of desirable goals or the achievement of
performance measures considered important to the corporation, it is
ineffective as an incentive or motivator." 2 The behavioral theory of
psychology suggests that rewards reinforce desirable behaviors only
when the rewards are connected to those behaviors in a systematic
110. The problem of risk aversion in American business may also be a product of systemic
forces at work in our securities markets. Short-term pressures to meet financial performance
measures utilized by stock analysts may render risky behavior impracticable. See id. at 55-57.
111. It is also odious to suggest that well-compensated managers need or should need
superfluous incentives to do their jobs well. See Michael J. Chime], The Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988: Codifying a Private Cause of Action, 1990 U. ILL. L.
REV. 645, 648 (observing that managers, who are compensated for their work in the form of
salary, are compelled under a fiduciary duty to serve the company).
112. Observe in this regard that compensation of executives through the authorization of
insider trading is only one of many forms of feasible compensation. Others might include
bonuses based on performance, salary and option increases, and deferred tax options related to
retirement benefits. The option of providing compensation via authorized insider trading is
simply one more means among many already existing processes for paying management.
Professor Dyer has noted that the mere addition of one new method of payment will not alter the
"basic process of deciding the dollar amount of each manager's compensation." Boyd Kimball
Dyer, Economic Analysis, Insider Trading, and Game Markets, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1, 13. If
Professor Dyer's assertion is correct, then no real gains in executive compensation can be
expected to result from authorized insider trading. In fact, a net loss should result due to the
inadvisability of compensating executives in a manner that has no connection to performance.
However, it is conceivable that there is a benefit to be gained from authorized insider trading
perquisites: if such trading can be done at no cost to the company, or at less cost to the company
than commensurate direct compensation, then this form of compensation, while inferior from a
motivational standpoint because unassociated with performance, may be cost efficient. The true
corporate costs and benefits of authorized insider trading are an issue that needs to be addressed,
both theoretically and empirically. For the most thorough treatment of this question to date, see
David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1449 (1986) (defending the practice of authorized insider trading from a transaction cost
perspective).
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way. 11 3 If the rewarded party cannot discern a pattern from which he
or she can attribute the reward to one type of activity exclusive of
others, the reward cannot stimulate any particular response.114 Exec-
utive compensation acts as an incentive only when the executive
makes a connection between what he or she does and the likelihood
that the reward will be attained. Because inside infbrmation and the
trading advantages it can confer are random with regard to managerial
performance, authorized insider trading is an irrational means of tying
compensation to performance at a time when pay for performance is
considered a basic tenet in determining executive salaries." 5
2. Objections to Insider Trading Are as Compelling in the Case of
Trading on Noninformation as They Are in the Case of Trading
on Actual Information, Because the Two Types of Insider
Trading Are Indistinguishable in Principle and in Effect
Insider trading is objectionable because it is unfair, 1 6 and because
it discourages ordinary investors from participating in markets they
perceive to be unfair.117 These basic grounds for regulation of insider
trading are relevant regardless of whether the trade is made on the
basis of real information or mere credibility. The objections to trading
on inside credibility11 are addressed individually herein.
a. Trading on Inside Credibility Is Unfair
The distinction between inside information and inside credibility is
technical rather than substantive. Rather than relay actual informa-
tion, the corporate insider has conveyed noninformation tantamount
to an assurance that information exists which would be acted upon if
known. Although the noninformation is cleansed in the hands of an
analyst who technically fails to send factual information, the benefit is
substantial to the degree that the insider's noninformaation is credible.
The only effective distinction between a tip of information and a tip of
113. For a discussion of the importance of linking reward structures to performance, see
Edward E. Lawler III, New Approaches to Pay: Innovations that Work, 53 PERSONNEL 11 (1976).
114. Id
115. See Byrne et al., supra note 98, at 53.
116. For a discussion of fairness arguments pertinent to insider trading, see Jennifer Moore,
What Is Really Unethical About Insider Trading?, 9 J. Bus. ETHics 171 (1990).
117. John W. Bagby, The Evolving Controversy over Insider Trading, 24 AM. Bus. L.J. 571,
579 n.55 (1986) (quoting Arthur Levitt, Jr., Chairman of the American Stock Exchange, "If the
investor thinks he's not getting a fair share, he's not going to invest and that is going to hurt
capital formation in the long run"); Classen, supra note 8, at 608 ("[I]nvestor confidence in the
securities markets directly impacts upon their stability.").
118. Since credibility trading and noninformational trading are two descriptive names
emphasizing different characteristics of an identical effect, I use the terms interchangeably.
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noninformation in the hands of the analyst is one added layer of risk:
the tippee of information bears only the risk that information is inac-
curate, while the tippee of noninformation bears two risks-the risk
that the information behind the tipper's advice is inaccurate, and the
risk that the tipper's judgment regarding the hidden information is
poor."19 It is precisely this second layer of risk that transforms trading
on noninformation into, in essence, trading on tipper credibility.
Because traders who use either inside information or inside
noninformation do bear these risks, the unfairness of their trades must
be grounded in the even greater risks of those who trade using neither
of these advantages. In fact, all rational trades employing inside infor-
mation or noninformation entail less risk than rational trades made in
the absence of inside advantage. The diminution of risk attendant to
rational inside trading can be conceptualized by creating an expected
value score for inside advantage. The three relevant kinds of trades
have different risk proffles, as follows:
Assume that the risk of purchasing the stock attributable to all factors
publicly known = 1.
Assume that the risk that relevant inside information is inaccurate
2.
Assume that the risk that a tipper of noninformation will apply poor
judgment in distilling the relevant information into a generic credibility
tip = 3.
One who trades using no tip trades subject to the risk designated 1.
One who trades using inside information trades subject to the risk of 1
fine-tuned by the added information contained in the tip and evaluated
with knowledge of the risk level designated 2. One who trades on a
noninformational tip trades subject to the risk designated by 1, fine-
tuned by the credibility tip which has a bi-faceted risk, represented by
2 and 3. Given these theoretical risk profiles, a preference ranking
develops, such that the lowest risk is associated with trades made on
inside information, a middle level of risk is associated with trades
made on noninformation, and the greatest risk is associated with
trades made on solely public information.12 The following hypotheti-
119. The risk in noninformational tips that the tipper's judgment regarding hidden
information is poor is arguably matched by an analogous risk in the case of informational tips-
the risk that one's own judgment regarding the information will be poor. The former risk is
arguably greater because the ultimate decision maker has less information to assess than in the
case of the latter risk.
120. Note that I refer to risk in this discussion in terms of investor uncertainty. The more
information available, the less uncertainty. While information may be inaccurate, it is preferable
to have that information with concomitant risk probabilities than to be denied that information.
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cal example helps us to understand the nature of these three risk
patterns.
Public knowledge of Acme Co. includes the possibility of new
licensing agreements with Zenith, bearing valuable patent rights in
new pharmaceutical products. Because the products appear to be
extremely promising, the risk that an investor would not reap a 15%
minimum return over one year is calculated at only 30%. Insider
Tom has secret knowledge, however, that Ann, a scientist friend at
Acme, has in fact successfully completed the fundamental research
involved in creating the product. If Ann has in fact :made the relevant
discovery, the risk that an investor would not reap the 15% annual
return is reduced to a mere 5%. If there is a 50% chance that Tom's
secret knowledge is correct, his investment risk"' = .5 x 30% + .5 x
5%, or 17.5%. If Tom relays a noninformational tip to Sue, exhorting
her to trade but refusing to divulge the source of his confidence, Sue
must assess Tom's credibility. If she believes that Tom is 70% reliable
in his investment judgments, Sue's investment risk = (.5 x 30%) +
(.3 x .5 x 30%) + (.7 x .5 x 5%), or 21.25% The risk is greatest
(30%) when trading on the least information, reduced (21.25%) when
trading on a limited increment of information, as when the informa-
tion is absorbed into tipper credibility, and reduced further (17.5%) as
the information becomes more precise-the case of actual information
rather than noninformational credibility.
The principle just demonstrated is associated with statistical error:
each bit of information, in conjunction with the probability of its accu-
racy, has the potential to reduce possible trading mistakes. Compared
against trades on purely public information, both informational and
noninformational tips confer on the trader an elite, reduced-risk sta-
tus. The only difference between the latter two types of tips is one of
reliability: informational tips are associated with one source of error,
where as noninformational tips are associated with two. The principle
behind them remains the same: each has the effect of' reducing trading
error by adding a degree of confidence not available to the
unadvantaged trader.122 From the standpoint of fairness, informa-
121. "Investment risk" refers here to the risk of not realizing a 15% minimum return over
one year.
122. While I discuss the issue of fairness here in terms of relative degrees of risk undertaken
by differing classes of investors distinguished by access to informaticn, fairness can also be
addressed in terms of varying costs of investment. Because the elemenis of risk and return are
positively correlated under normative investment theory, those who faea greater risks also bear
greater costs, in light of a given return. Thus some scholars have criticized the practice of insider
trading as unfair by noting the way discrepancies in information confer upon insiders a pricing




tional and noninformational tips are therefore on equal footing, both
objectionable because they create an inequitable disparity of risk
among various classes of investors. 123  Because the disparity is not
grounded in principle124 and because it confers no social advantage, it
is ethically unjustified.12
b. Trading on Inside Credibility Is Likely to Discourage Ordinary
Investors from Participating in Markets Because They
Perceive the Markets To Be Unfair
Whether an advantaged party trades on inside information or inside
noninformation, those of us who rely entirely on public knowledge are
relatively disadvantaged.26 As I have observed in the preceding sec-
tion, information bears less risk than credibility, and has more value as
a result. Still, reliable noninformation adds an increment of value
apart from the baseline of public information on which the vast major-
ity of traders rely. The perception of unfairness in the marketplace is
therefore a function of the inside nature of the advantage, whether
informational or noninformational.
parity of information, or she enters a transaction at a price that differs from an informed-decision
price. For a discussion of the ways in which insider trading harms non-insiders, see William K.S.
Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who Is
Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule lOb-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1235-40
(1981).
123. The reasoning which relates fairness to equality of access to information is best stated in
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cerL denied sub nom. Coates v.
SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The court in Texas Gulf Sulphur states the purpose of rule lOb-5 to be
"equal access [of all investors] to the rewards of participation in securities transactions." Iad at
851-52.
124. One commentator argues "[losses are caused by... legitimate nondisclosure, and this
is an ordinary market risk." Stephanie F. Barkholz, Comment, Insider Trading, the
Contemporaneous Trader, and the Corporate Acquirer: Entitlement to Profits Disgorged by the
SEC, 40 EMORY L.J. 537, 556 (1991). By "ordinary" risk, the author presumably means a
normal risk that we have come to expect under the present system of limited regulation. Yet
attributing these risks as "ordinary" under our present system does not justify them ethically or
economically. Such risks reflect an inequity recognized to exist but not grounded in principle.
125. For a discussion of the deontological and teleological analysis of insider trading, see
Salbu, supra note 46.
126. The source of this disadvantage is disparity in both risk and cost between buyer and
seller. See Cox, supra note 89, at 653 ("the dominant constraint to the belief that parties will
enter into mutually advantageous contractual arrangements is that they must know the
consequences of their acts. It is essential, therefore, that the parties know the costs and benefits
of their actions if they are to negotiate a mutually advantageous contract."). While Professor
Cox seems to be addressing an ideal rather than necessary state of contracting, knowledge of
future costs and benefits associated with contracting is crucial to assessing the risk of the
transaction, so that disparity in access to this knowledge fundamentally changes the nature and
equity of the contractual arrangement.
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This means that inside information and inside credibility can be dis-
tinguished only in terms of degree. If trading on inside information
erodes investor confidence, then trading on inside noninformation
does the same, although perhaps less dramatically and severely.
Therefore, when judges and scholars observe that insider trading dam-
ages the integrity of the market via disintegration of investor trust,
they implicitly condemn the analogous effects of noninformational
advantage in the market as well.
That insider advantages of all sorts detract from the public's overall
faith in market integrity is well documented. 12 7 The Supreme Court
has observed that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was drafted "to
restore public confidence in financial markets."1"8  Scholars have
observed that investor confidence has been maintained in large part
due to the informational egalitarianism created by our securities
laws.129 Journalists likewise report reactions to periodic insider trad-
ing scandals in terms of loss of investor confidence, 3 0 a phenomenon
likely in itself to plant the seeds of investor distrust -pursuant to publi-
cized securities market abuses. The diminution of investor confidence
that is likely to result from use of inside advantage has widespread
economic effects. Mistrust of capital markets has been attributed as
the cause of poor performance of those markets when established in
developing countries;"' moreover, reduction of individual participa-
tion in the stock market causes a concomitant reduction in market
liquidity 3 2 and the level of both domestic and international investor
participation in American markets. 1 3
Because inside information and inside credibility are analogous on
every dimension except degree, the use of each is accountable for a
portion of investor apprehension, bearing undesirable increments of
127. For a detailed overview of the relationship between inside advantage and investor
confidence, see Spencer D. Klein, Note, Insider Trading, SEC Decision-making, and the Calculus
of Investor Confidence, 16 HoFsTRA L. REv. 665 (1988).
128. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137,
150 (1984).
129. See, e.g., Arthur Fleischer, Jr., et al., An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose
Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 798, 816 (1973).
130. See, eg., Hobard Rowen, White Knuckles on Wall Street, WASH. POsT, Nov. 20, 1986,
at A27, col. 6 (responding to the Ivan Boesky scandal and observing that small investors were
likely to lose faith in capital markets as a result of Boesky's highly publicized activities).
131. Hsiu-Kwang Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 68 CoLuM. L. REV. 260, 264 (1968).
132. See DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK xiv (1988).





additional macro-market cost and risk. For the public confidence to
be wholly maintained or restored, regulatory efforts must address both
the obvious and the less obvious sources of unfairness. Ultimately,
public awareness of the more insidious varieties of inside advantage
may render our present regulatory approach insignificant in protecting
the fairness, integrity, and public support of securities markets.
C. Abstention from Trading
Under common law as well as rule lOb-5, the problem of fairness in
securities markets has been addressed from the perspective of fraud.
The perpetration of fraud requires an intentional misrepresentation of
material fact, upon which the deceived party relies to his or her detri-
ment.13 4 In the case of largely anonymous securities market trades,
fraud related to inside information virtually always occurs through the
process of trading without disclosing the secret information while
under a fiduciary duty to disclose or abstain from trading. Accord-
ingly, rule lOb-5 prohibits fraud or deception "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security."1 35
It is therefore impossible to violate the laws meant to ensure fairness
of informational access without entering into a transaction, just as the
notion of fraud is inexorably tied to the contingency of a contract. 136
Yet information is used in securities markets both to transact and to
defer from transacting. Some information results in a decision to buy
or sell, but other information guides its recipient to abstain from buy-
ing or selling. Securities market decisions can be divided in this man-
ner into two categories: decisions to transact and decisions not to
transact.
While inside information is equally valuable in making either type
of decision, and confers an equally unfair advantage in each case, its
use is proscribed only for the purposes of entering transactions. When
an investor uses inside information to decide not to buy or sell, there is
no transaction upon which to hang the legal doctrine of fraud, and
there is no tangible activity from which to deduce that an unfair
advantage has been exploited or to prove such exploitation.
Yet this second category of insider advantage-that of "insider
abstention"-is indistinguishable from the first category in terms of
134. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
135. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
136. While fraud has taken on the nature of a hybrid between tort and contract law, the
gravamen of fraud is misrepresentation as an inducement to enter into a transaction with




fairness and equality of market participation. Decisions not to trans-
act are as important to the investor as the eventual positive investment
choices he or she makes.137 A decision to hold rat.her than to sell,
based on inside information, may be highly profitable, yet remains
unrestricted under rule lOb-5 because it entails no purchase or sale.
Likewise, the knowledge not to invest represents an advantage in the
assessment of opportunity costs, in the form of elimination of certain
buying and selling options as undesirable. The ability to discount any
options through the employment of inside information thereby confers
an advantage over those who choose among investment alternatives
without such benefit, resulting in precisely the disparities that the
insider trading laws should efface. Unfortunately, as we shall see in
the section that follows, it is both legally and logistically difficult to
regulate the use of inside information as a factor in the decision to
abstain from trading.
III. POLICY ALTERNATIVES TO CLOSE THE GAP
BETWEEN THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT OF
INSIDER TRADING REGULATIONS
The elusive forms of insider exploitation discussed in section II are
beyond the scope of existing regulations, largely because they are
extremely difficult to detect, and have therefore played no role in the
development of fraud as a cause of action for insider trading. The
discussion in this section begins to explore some possible avenues for
closing the gap between currently prohibited and currently permitted
practices, all of which are unfair as well as inefficient. While each
potential response to these disparities in the law has some potential to
reduce inconsistency, all are costly as well, and are meant only to
begin the scholarly discourse necessary to approach a feasible solution.
A. Authorization of Insider Trading
An obvious means of closing the gap between the letter and the
spirit of our insider trading laws is to eliminate them, an option that
has been recommended by numerous legal scholars and economists.13 8
137. My decision on a given day not to sell shares of Meridian stock is conceptually
indistinguishable from my decision to buy those shares on that same day, assuming in the latter
instance that I did not have them at the beginning of that day. Holding a given piece of a
currently existing portfolio is tantamount to purchasing a piece of the sune size and character
that is presently missing from my portfolio. Although the economic nature of these two
decisions is identical, only the former is prohibited under our insider trading laws, because the
latter entails no trade.
138. See, eg., MANNE, supra note 91; Carlton & Fischel, supra note 92.
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Professor Manne has suggested that insider trading is economically
efficient, expediting market assimilation of information 139 and provid-
ing a form of managerial compensation. 1" Others have argued that
concerns regarding the fairness and efficiency effects of insider trading
should be supported by empirical evidence before the freedom to trade
on inside information is abrogated. 141  Professors Branson 42 and
Dooley 43 both suggest that the pervasiveness of insider trading and
the difficulty of controlling it render its regulation ineffectual. This
impracticability is exacerbated by the phenomena we have observed, in
the form of evasive cognates of classical insider trading. If it is diffi-
cult to monitor and sanction insider trading, and even more difficult to
identify and punish other forms of exploitation of inside information,
then effective, consistently applied regulation may simply not be
feasible. 144
While legalization of insider trading laws would eliminate the dis-
parities discussed in section II, consistency would be gained at the
expense of fairness and efficiency. As discussed earlier, insider trading
creates disparate classes of investors based on fortuitous differences in
situation rather than on merit.1 45 Such a distinction is morally sus-
pect. Likewise, we have examined in detail the creation, through
insider trading, of economic inefficiencies associated with erosion of
investor confidence 146 and increased agency costs.147 Because the
reduction of exploitation of insider advantage is both morally and eco-
nomically sound, we should support regulation that ameliorates such
practices whenever possible. Thus, the best solution to disparate treat-
ment of abusive practices would be to prohibit all the practices. Our
present system is incomprehensive, but beneficial to the limited extent
139. MANNE, supra note 91, at 77-91. The assimilation of information argument is usually
discussed in terms of market signals which drive the price of securities closer to equilibrium,
thereby enhancing overall market efficiency. For a critique of the market signalling hypothesis,
see Ronald K. Gilson & Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L.
Rav. 549, 572-79 (1984).
140. See MANNE, supra note 91, at 138-41; see also discussion supra part II.B.l.b.
141. See, eg., Frank Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and
the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 309, 338.
142. Douglas M. Branson, Discourse on the Supreme Court's Approach to SEC Rule 10b-5 and
Insider Trading, 30 EMORY L.J. 263 (1981).
143. See Dooley, supra note 93.
144. For a more detailed discussion of the logistical difficulties in monitoring these kinds of
abuses, see Diana L. Hegarty, Note, Rule 10b-5 and the Evolution of Common-Law Fraud-The
Need for an Effective Statutory Proscription for Insider Trading by Outsiders, 22 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 813 (1988).
145. See Moore, supra note 116.
146. See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
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of its current reach. Some restraint of insider advantage is better than
no restraint, despite the inconsistencies that result. Following this line
of analysis, abolition of all insider trading laws is a poor mechanism
for establishing consistency. By permitting all forms of insider abuse,
it resolves a leaky dam problem by tearing down the dam itself. While
complete equality of access to usable information is the ideal, some
equality is better than none. Legalizing insider trading is not an effec-
tive solution to the problem at issue.
B. Policing Information
The policies that regulate insider trading are inadequate because the
uses of information are more complex than we often realize. Informa-
tion that supports tipper credibility allows for trading on noninforma-
tion, technically circumventing the regulations. 48 Likewise, trades on
non-facts are not easily regulated, and abstention from trading based
on inside information cannot practicably be monitored, sanctioned, or
even observed, because the decisions behind abstention manifest no
behavior. 149
Because the methods of evading the present regulations are multifa-
rious and appear intractable, one alternative to simply policing trades
is to police the information itself. This can be accomplished in two
ways: through mandatory disclosure and through mandatory confi-
dentiality. 50 While regulation of disclosure and confidentiality have
been minimal in the United States, 151 they are more pervasive in the
securities laws of the European Economic Community (EEC) and
Japan. The EEC Directive on Insider Trading prohibits, for example,
tipping by insiders outside of the "normal course of... employment,
profession or duties." '52  Japanese securities laws, while often criti-
148. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
150. Neither mandatory disclosure nor mandatory confidentiality has been a popular policy
choice among American academic and judicial commentators, probably because they are viewed
as an abrogation of individual and corporate freedoms. Of the two, mandatory disclosure has
received more serious attention than mandatory confidentiality. See, e.g., Theresa A. Gabaldon,
The Disclosure of Preliminary Merger Negotiations as an Imperfect Paradigm of Rule lob-5
Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1218 (1987) (recommending the establishment of a duty to
announce preliminary merger negotiations).
151. American disclosure laws are limited to a few sensitive areas such as potential takeovers
and corporate stock issue prospectuses. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78p(a), 78(m)(d) (1988). Mandatory confidentiality laws are virtually nonexistent.
152. Council Directive 89/592 of 13 November 1989 Coordinating Regulations on Insider
Dealing, art. 3, 1989 O.3. (L 334) 30, 31.
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cized for being sporadically and ineffectively enforced,"5 3 require that
certain broad classes of information remain confidential,"' while
others must be publicly disclosed. 55
Although they appear to be conceptual opposites, mandatory disclo-
sure and mandatory confidentiality both have the potential to curb
abuses connected with nonpublic information. Mandatory disclosure
laws reduce the body of such information, thereby indirectly reducing
the opportunities that exist for unfairly exploiting it. Mandatory con-
fidentiality rules inhibit the movement of nonpublic information, effec-
tively isolating it to limited pockets. As the information is less fluidly
dispersed, the number of parties with access to it declines.
Whereas disclosure laws reduce the quantity of secrets, confidential-
ity laws help to keep the remaining secrets from being scattered among
a select network of insiders, each of whom may potentially exploit the
secret in securities market transactions or non-transactions. Because
disclosure and confidentiality rules approach the same goal using dif-
ferent techniques, they can exist simultaneously and continue to effec-
tuate in tandem the reduction of abuses. Both of these forms of
information policing would be likely to reduce trades made on inside
information and on inside noninformation alike, because the ultimate
source of noninformational credibility is undisclosed information. As
mandatory disclosure reduces the pool of nonpublic information, or as
mandatory confidentiality reduces the movement of nonpublic infor-
mation, both informational and credibility tipping opportunities are
reduced.
Mandatory disclosure rules are alluring, apart from their effect of
reducing insider exploitation opportunities, because they theoretically
expedite the dispersement of information in the marketplace, enhanc-
ing the movement of securities prices toward true equilibrium. 56
Investors who are given an optimal amount of information as early as
possible should be better able to evaluate the risks of alternative invest-
153. See Mark E. Perlmutter, Developments in the Japanese Securities Markets, in
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS 87, 94 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 572, 1987).
154. See 10c INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION § 11.10,
at 11-33, (Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff eds., 1st rev. ed. 1992).
155. Id.
156. For a discussion of market assimilation of signals and information in general, and effect
on market equilibrium, see Kose John & Banikanta Mishra, Information Content of Insider




ments, and are likely to develop an improved sense of confidence in the
integrity of markets in general.157
While mandatory disclosure and mandatory confidentiality may
reduce opportunities to exploit nonpublic information or noninforma-
tion,15 8 these options are costly. Mandatory disclosure of information
is an invasion of corporate freedom, restricting a company's ability to
determine what degree of stealth is necessary for the successful imple-
mentation of its strategies. 159 Legally compelled di;closure in contra-
vention of the corporation's strategic interests is likely to harm
shareholders, whose investment is injured when corporate strategy is
undermined. 6" Moreover, the processes of compiling, printing, and
disseminating the materials required by disclosure rules impose addi-
tional costs.' If we add the opportunity costs incurred by the com-
pany as it devotes its attention to regulatory compliance instead of its
direct business, total costs of mandatory disclosure appear to be
significant.1
62
An example of mandatory confidentiality is what Koenig refers to
as a "No-Comment" rule regarding pending takeover activity.'
63
Such a rule would require companies negotiating mergers and acquisi-
tions to decline from commenting on those negotiations.'" A
mandatory "No-Comment" rule purports to avoid insider exploitation
157. See James Harlan Koenig, Comment, The Basics of Disclosure: The Market for
Information in the Market for Corporate Control 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1021, 1060-61 (1989)
(discussing the benefits of early mandated disclosure of takeover activity).
158. Some commentators have questioned the effectiveness of mandatory disclosure laws at
curbing insider trading abuses. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic
Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 740 (1984) (suggesting that an
interval exists between mandated disclosure and market absorption of information in which
insiders could still trade to their advantage, even while technically abiding by disclosure
requirements).
159. For a more detailed discussion of this problem, see Salbu, supra note 41, at 863-66.
160. Thus, while compulsory disclosure may serve the macroeconomic effect of improving
information access parity, it does so at the cost of shareholder wealth. For discussion of the
harm to shareholders effectuated by compulsory disclosure, see Dennis S. Karjala, A Coherent
Approach to Misleading Corporate Announcements, Fraud, and Rule 101-5, 52 ALB. L. REV. 957,
976 n.97 (1988).
161. See Koenig, supra note 157, at 1064-65.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1065-67; see also Hazen, supra note 56.
164. Many companies have adopted this strategy voluntarily to avoid liability under Basic,
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), in which the defendant was held liable under rule lOb-5
for publicly denying the existence of its merger negotiations, thereby committing "fraud on the
market" and implicitly causing those who sold their shares to lose prospective appreciation in
value. Because companies have compelling reasons for stealth in prospective merger activity,
including the avoidance of early price run-ups which increase the cost of the merger, some




of information by isolating the information and stanching its flow. 165
Mandatory confidentiality is potentially even more costly than
mandatory disclosure, and it is unlikely to be effective-it constitutes a
systematic inhibition of information necessary to the efficient function-
ing of a free marketplace, particularly the market's ability to mediate
accurately the prices of securities. 16 6 Whereas mandatory disclosure is
a coercive measure which at least fortifies the foundation of valuable,
accurate market information, mandatory confidentiality is likely to
deter market efficiency by reducing the pool of information.
Mandatory confidentiality is unlikely to be effective, because inevitable
and untraceable breaches may continue to support the surreptitious
utilization of inside advantage. Most importantly, confidentiality rules
do nothing to deter the problems of noninformational trading and
abstention from trading. Since confidentiality can only be relative and
can never be absolute or complete, abstention from trading by those
insiders who are privy to the information will continue to occur. And
noninformational credibility tipping which does not technically
divulge the supporting information will also be in technical compli-
ance with the confidentiality requirement. 167 Given these valid con-
cerns, courts have been justifiably reluctant to seek gains in market
fairness by inhibiting the flow of information. 168
C. Closing the Loophole and Allowing Inferences of Fraud from
Circumstantial Evidence
If abstention from trading and trading on tipper credibility are as
objectionable as classical insider trading, we can prohibit these more
elusive acts and omissions by expanding the interpretation of fraud
contained in rule lOb-5, or by enacting new legislation.
Trades made on tipper credibility and noninformation are currently
outside the scope of our insider trading laws because they fail to meet
the "material fact" component of fraud.169 While one's credibility is
predicated upon a great mass of information and facts which are
165. Koenig, supra note 157, at 1065-67.
166. For a discussion of the importance of information to market efficiency, see Dyer, supra
note 112, at 5.
167. While mandatory disclosure has its limitations as noted, supra notes 156-62 and
accompanying text, it does help deter the problems of noninformational trading and abstention
from trading, whereas mandatory confidentiality is ineffectual against the latter. This is because
mandatory disclosure provides the earliest possible level playing field. Once the information
becomes public, the value of noninformational tips is diffused, and everyone has an equal chance
to abstain from trading, based on the relevant facts.
168. See, eg., In re Investors Management Co., Inc., 44 S.E.C. 633, 646 (1971).
169. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 525 (1977).
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incorporated into one's judgments and opinions, courts have not
attempted to assess the significance of information and facts in the
process of credibility tipping. 170 Moreover, it is difficult to prove sci-
enter and intent to defraud in these cases, wherein the misrepresenta-
tion of fact is in itself elusive. Abstention from trading is also difficult
to proscribe, because our present approach is to outlaw insider trad-
ing,171 and abstention consists of the decision not tc trade. Yet none
of these complications is insurmountable, in terms of either widening
the reach of present regulations or overcoming evidentiary difficulties.
All of the loophole categories discussed in section II can rationally
be outlawed under an expansive yet tenable interpretation of the ele-
ment of fraud contained in rule lOb-5. Trades made on tipper credibil-
ity and noninformation can be prohibited as fraudulent when the
tippee knows or has reason to know that the source' 72 of tipper credi-
bility is comprised of nonpublic information. The tippee's understand-
ing that a tip is supported by implicit inside information can
reasonably provide the elements of intent and scienter necessary to
prove fraud. Trades based on inside opinion are plausibly fraudulent
as well, provided that the tipper's opinion is derived from inside fac-
tual information."'
It is far more difficult to render abstention from trading fraudulent,
even when the exploitation of inside information is supported by evi-
dence. The easiest case is one in which the holder of stocks provides
plenty of proof of original intent to sell, such as written memos or
conversations to this effect. If the holder then receives inside informa-
tion that militates against selling, and finally decides to hold the
stocks, an inference that he has relied on material information to
refrain from trading is plausible. Yet even this case is not simple-in
order to extrapolate fraud from trading omission, we must be able to
show that the inside information caused the abstention. Proving cau-
sality in the case of non-behavior is substantially more difficult than
170. In fact, courts have not even had the opportunity to discover implicit fraud behind
credibility tips, because virtually all of the insider trading cases to date entail actual information
or knowledge rather than implicit information or knowledge.
171. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
172. "The" source can be replaced by "a" source or "a significant" saurce, depending on the
ultimately desired comprehensiveness of the interpretation of fraud.
173. While the courts can infer fraud from these types of trades in some cases, there will be
other cases, probably the preponderance, in which the courts cannot or should not find intent
and scienter. Many advisees of investment professionals do not have reason to know that they
receive noninformational or nonfactual tips based on inside information; these persons certainly
lack the culpability required for criminal and even civil liability. In these instances, the best




proving causality in the case of action. This is because inertia is the
human default mode, whereas action is the exception. It is relatively
easy to trace an action to effective causes, whereas default may be
caused by nothing at all, and is in actuality presumed under most cir-
cumstances to reflect no intent. In the great majority of cases that lack
the explicit evidence contained in my hypothetical, proof of elements
of fraud will be all the harder.
Apart from the difficulties associated with prosecuting individual
cases of "fraudulent abstention," there are policy concerns that disfa-
vor such an extension of existing laws. The possibility that one's mere
holding of stocks, or one's decisions not to buy stocks, may be evi-
dence of civil and criminal fraud, is likely to have an insupportable
chilling effect on participation in securities markets. Given the likeli-
hood of error when courts attribute fraudulent motives to inertia, the
marginal risk of investing under fraudulent abstention laws would be
significant. Those who might not be dissuaded from market participa-
tion by systematic risk may find this marginal threat, over which they
have little control, intolerable.
Apart from difficulties in proving intent, fraudulent abstention
under both common law and rule lOb-5 interpretation still requires
some connection with a transaction.1 74 Two possible avenues exist to
overcome this difficulty. First, fraudulent abstention could be regu-
lated by statute in its own right. Second, fraudulent abstention could
be viewed as fraud on the entire market, 175 as decisions to abstain are
coupled with decisions to enter alternative exchange, which would
technically qualify as a transaction.
Yet the loophole categories are presently beyond the purview of
insider trading regulations. Because they are conceptually analogous
to the more explicit forms of behavior that are prohibited, it is likely
that the gaps in coverage are a function of implementation difficul-
ties-the problems incumbent upon finding and proving intent to
exploit inside information in invisible ways. Trades made on tipper
credibility and noninformation are difficult to trace. Records of
generic recommendations to buy or sell are by nature more ambiguous
than evidence of explicit tipping of information. Inferences of a com-
munication of inside advantage are more precarious because of the
174. See supra notes 38-49 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 164. The reasoning behind fraud on the market theory is as follows:
Information affects pricing within the marketplace, and intentional misrepresentation will create
inaccuracy in market pricing. Anyone who purchases stocks overvalued, or sells stocks
undervalued, due to such a misrepresentation, will suffer a loss when the stocks finally absorb the
true information and their price adjusts accordingly.
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many possible bases for the communication, some of which may be
innocent and some of which may reflect exploitation of an unfair
advantage. Likewise, patterns of abstention from trading based on
inside information are more difficult to prove than analogous patterns
of trading, simply because it is more difficult to infer significant mean-
ing from omissions, an infinite number of which exist in our daily
lives, than from the finite collection of an individuad's actions.
To the extent that fraud can and should be extended to cover the
forms of behavior and non-behavior that evade our present regula-
tions, circumstantial evidence can be admitted and -weighed to permit
inferences of fraud. In SEC v. Hellberg, 17 6 a jury used circumstantial
evidence to impose liability on a defendant who denied knowledge of
inside information. The defendant's son was employed as a financial
analyst.177 The defendant purchased call options for a company's
stock prior to the announcement of a tender offer made by the son's
employer, and profited from the increase in price that followed the
announcement of the offer. 178 The jury applied circumstantial evi-
dence to infer that the father had knowledge of the impending tender
offer, despite the defendant's claims to the contrary. 179
Circumstantial evidence can be applied in a similar way to deter-
mine whether a defendant intended to commit fraud180 on the basis of
implicit rather than explicit information. 8' While circumstantial evi-
dence differs from direct evidence by requiring the ir.termediate step of
inference, it is not by virtue of this distinction inherently inferior to
direct evidence. The value of circumstantial evidence, indeed of all
evidence, is a function of the likelihood that the conclusions derived
from the proof thereof are factually correct. Circumstantial evidence
may be highly probative or highly speculative, 182 depending on the




180. Circumstantial evidence may be necessary to prove fraud in a large number of cases,
simply because the gravamen of fraud is not particularly well-suited ta the problems raised by
insider trading. For example, it is difficult to show reliance on a misrepresentation when no
statement has been made. As a result, reliance must often be inferred from existing
circumstances rather than proven using direct evidence. For a discussion of these problems, see
Note, Private Causes of Action for Option Investors Under SEC Rule 1b-.5: A Policy, Doctrinal,
and Economic Analysis, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1959, 1972 (1987).
181. Circumstantial evidence can also be applied to determine whfther an abstention from
trading comprises fraud, although this is probably inadvisable.
182. In this vein, McCormick defines relevancy of evidence in terms of the degree to which it
"advances the inquiry." McCormick On Evidence 544 (Edward W. -Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).




probabilities of viable alternative explanations."8 3 A confluence of
extremely unlikely events may render an extremely high probability
that a trade has been made with knowledge that a tipper's credibility is
supported by nonpublic information. Combined with laws that
broaden the prohibitions presently in place, increased reliance on cir-
cumstantial evidence could help to narrow that gap between permissi-
ble and impermissible forms of insider exploitation.
D. Prohibition of Trading Among the Classes Most Likely to
Exploit Inside Information
Although it is difficult to establish culpable intent based on
noninformational trading, or to trace abstention from trading to inside
advantage, it may be possible to identify broad classes of investors
most likely to have access to these forms of privilege. Because individ-
ual infractions are extremely difficult to monitor, prohibition of any
trading in particular securities by members of these groups may signif-
icantly diminish the opportunities to gain unfair advantage using
insider status.
Rule 16(b) of the 1934 Act is just this kind provision.18 4  The rule
requires disgorgement of profits, gained by purchase and sale or sale
and purchase within six months,1 85 of ten percent beneficial owners,
directors, and officers.18 6  Restricting the short-swing profits of insid-
ers is an attempt to deter them from several forms of abuse of nonpub-
lic information: 87 the mere trading upon that information,188 the
manipulation of corporate strategy in order to create individual trad-
ing opportunities,1 89 and the development of "unorthodox transac-
tions," such as the loophole varieties at issue in this Article.1 90
probative value, which may be higher for some circumstantial evidence than for other direct
evidence.
183. See Jonathan J. Koehler, The Probity/Policy Distinction in the Statistical Evidence
Debate, 66 TUL. L. REv. 141, 147-48 (1991) (suggesting that statistical evidence can be as
valuable as "particularistic" evidence, depending on their comparative probative values).
184. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988).
185. Id.
186. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1988).
187. For a good general discussion of section 16(b), see Arnold S. Jacobs, An Analysis of
Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 209 (1987).
188. While this function appears to overlap that of rule 10b-5, creation of strict liability for
short-swing trades of insiders was believed necessary to overcome difficulties in proving the
elements of fraud, particularly intent. See O'Connor, supra note 2, at 321.
189. See id. at 322; Samuelson, supra note 2, at 517; Thel, supra note 7, at 405-52.
190. See Philip J. Boeckman, Note, The War on Insider Trading: Is Fighting over "Officer" a
Losing Battle?, 55 Mo. L. REv. 297, 299-300 (1990).
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Rule 16(b) should, in theory, limit the possibilities of the more eva-
sive abuses of insider advantage. By strictly prohibiting profits gained
in one class of inside transaction, both informational and noninforma-
tional advantage alike are thwarted. Unfortunately, the proportion of
total noninformational trading actually done by insiders is probably
relatively small. Insiders are more likely than outsiders to have fac-
tual information, so that most of the persons who trade on
noninformational credibility are likely to be outsiders, beyond the
scope of section 16(b). The restriction of short-swing profits is even
less likely to affect the exploitation of inside knowledge in deciding to
abstain from transaction, since the emphasis on six-month turnover
requires, like rule lOb-5, a purchase or sale rather than an omission to
act.
A more severe restriction than section 16(b), prohibiting managerial
insiders from trading in the securities of the companies they manage,
might be more effective in reducing possibilities of unfair advantage.
In particular, such prohibition would largely inhibit insiders from
incurring non-transactional gains based on decisions to hold rather
than sell, because they would be prohibited from ever possessing the
securities in the first place. Yet both section 16(b) and a more com-
plete proscription of inside ownership come at a high cost.
The prohibition of short-swing profits is arbitrary, establishing lia-
bility solely on the basis of time, so that a trade of less than six months
is prohibited while a trade one day beyond six months is permitted.191
The removal of the element of intent, aimed at the broad reduction of
undesirable practices that are difficult to detect and to prove, unfortu-
nately renders section 16(b) over-inclusive, and likely to cover inno-
cent actions as well as disingenuous ones. 192 Perhaps more crucially,
both section 16(b) and a more severe prohibition of any inside owner-
ship will respectively reduce or eliminate managerial ownership of
shares. This reduction has several undesirable implications: the dimi-
nution of the pool of potential investors may impair the company's
ability to raise capital, as well as artificially depress stock prices by
artificially restricting demand. Moreover, restrictions on managerial
ownership exacerbate a major problem in corporate governance: the
difficulties that arise due to the separation of ownership and control. 193
Managers who are also owners are less likely to be in conflict of inter-
191. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988).
192. For a detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see Salbu, supra note 41, at 859-63.
193. For the classic statement concerning agency problems arising from the separation of




est with shareholders, 19 so that the greater management's proprietary
interests, the lower the agency costs associated with professional man-
agement. 115 While restrictions on managerial ownership of stocks will
inevitably reduce opportunities for insider abuses, they also widen the
chasm of differences between the interests of management and the
interests of capital. 196
E. Application of a Reduced-Threshold "Fraudulent Scheme"
Concept to Trigger Liability in Loophole Cases
The concept of a fraudulent scheme19 7 has generally been applied in
cases concerning securities offerings rather than insider trading of out-
standing shares.198 The idea of a fraudulent scheme has effectively lib-
eralized the application of the elements of common law fraud,
operating to replace rigorous proof of reliance with generic "but for"
causality.199 For our purposes here, I would define a fraudulent
scheme as a deceptive practice intended to or reasonably likely to
undermine the integrity of federal securities markets.2 "c This con-
struction of fraudulent scheme liberates rule lOb-5 from the con-
straints of common law fraud, and allows it to serve the more generic
purposes of protecting the integrity of national securities markets. °1
Professor Karjala has observed in this vein, "When ...fraudulent
intent is coupled with the use of the facilities of the national securities
194. For a discussion of the nature of agency costs associated with professional management,
see Jensen & Meckling, supra note 105.
195. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 107, at 7 ("Economic rationality dictates that stock
ownership by management motivates executives to identify more closely with the shareholders'
economic interests. Indeed, we would expect that the greater the proportion of personal wealth
invested in company stock or tied to stock options, the greater would be management's
shareholder orientation.").
196. For this reason, Professor Demsetz has urged that managers be encouraged to trade and
own shares in the companies they manage. See Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and
the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 375, 387 (1983).
197. The proscription of fraudulent schemes is contained in 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1992),
which renders it unlawful "to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud," in connection
with securities transactions. The terms "fraudulent scheme" and "deceptive scheme" will be
used interchangeably in this discussion.
198. See, eg., Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102
(1983).
199. Id. at 469-70.
200. In regard to insider trading in particular, the deceptive practice will likely be one
exploiting disparity of access to information, so that any utilization of inside information, by act
or omission, would be part of a "fraudulent scheme."
201. For a discussion of the notion that rule lOb-5 should be tied to federal rather than state
concerns, see Karjala, supra note 26.
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markets, there is no longer any need to bootstrap into federal court on
the basis of a technical violation of state law." '202
Consistent with this reasoning, proof of a fraudulent scheme to
undermine federal securities markets would rely solely on an inten-
tionally deceptive act or omission. All other elements of common law
fraud can be supplied by establishing an inference that the elements
have been subsumed within market dynamics and are implicit,
although largely elusive of direct proof. A "scheme to defraud the
market" would technically require all the elements of fraud: intent,
misrepresentation, materiality, causation, reliance, and injury. Infer-
ence of these elements would reflect the presumption that misrepresen-
tation or intentional acts of deception defraud the entire market
mechanism.20 3
The fraud on the market theory, as adopted in Basic, Inc. v. Levin-
son, 204 removes the plaintiff's burden of directly proving the element
of reliance.20 5 While the decision technically creates a rebuttable pre-
sumption of reliance based on the notion that the entire market
absorbs misrepresentations, 206 the Court did not explain how rebuttal
of the broad economic principles supporting the theory could occur,
and Justice White observed that the nominally rebuttable presumption
is de facto irrebuttable.2 °7 Combined with the tendency of courts to
obfuscate distinctions between causality and reliance in securities
fraud cases,20 8 the fraud on the market theory has substantial potential
to erode the plaintiff's burden of proving both the causation of injury
and the reliance elements in rule lOb-5 claims.
While the fraud on the market theory is still in the process of devel-
opment, it is likely to be used increasingly in the future to establish by
presumption elements of fraud apart from causation and reliance. If
intent of a scheme to defraud and materiality can be proved, inferences
regarding market dynamics can be used to establish the element of
injury as well as causation and reliance. The concept of a fraudulent
scheme under rule lOb-5, established with the assistance of fraud on
202. Id. at 1534.
203. See sources cited supra note 10.
204. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
205. Id. at 250.
206. For more detailed discussion of fraud on the market theory, see In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88
F.R.D. 134, 142-45 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of
Dispensing with Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REV.
435 (1984); Michael A. Lynn, Note, Fraud on the Market: An Emerging Theory of Recovery
Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 627 (1982).
207. Basic, 485 U.S. at 256 n.7 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).




the market inferences, can help close the gaps created by loophole situ-
ations. Justification of this line of reasoning requires two steps: (1)
acceptance of the utilization of fraud on the market theory to establish
a fraudulent scheme based solely on direct proof of an intentional
deceptive act or omission, and (2) an understanding of how this
reduced threshold cause of action will be so inclusive as to encompass
abstention from trading, as well as credibility and noninformational
trading.
L Expanding Application of Fraud on the Market Theory
The fraud on the market theory can be used to establish a justifiable
inference, not only of reliance but also of causality and injury, in com-
bination with direct proof of a scheme of intentional deceptive act or
omission. Under the reasoning in Basic, the market as a whole sys-
tematically relies on the veracity of information by incorporating that
information into the pricing of securities.209 Imagine, for example, a
shareholder who sells stocks based on an intentional misrepresentation
of fact, such as the denial of current merger negotiations. Although
the equilibrium value of the stocks would have been $65 per share in
the absence of misrepresentation, the market price at time of sale is
$50. Under the fraud on the market theory, all who sell at $50 have
sold in reliance upon the misrepresentation, regardless of whether they
were aware that it was made, because the $50 price which incorpo-
rated that misrepresentation was part of the inducement to sell, as
indeed price is always a consideration in hold-or-sell decisions.
Because price differentiation is a factor in buy, hold, or sell decisions,
it is reasonable to presume that the deceptive statement was an effi-
cient cause of the plaintiff's injury. A misrepresentation that can be
shown to effect undervaluation of stocks can be presumed to cause
injury to those who sell. Likewise, a misrepresentation that can be
shown to effect overvaluation of stocks can be presumed to cause
injury to those who buy.
The case of silent trading based on inside information as well as
inside noninformation is analogous to this example of active, explicit
misrepresentation. Although the deceptive scheme which causes the
plaintiff's injury is comprised of entering a transaction without dis-
closing the information or noninformation, the effect of silent decep-
tion is indistinguishable from that of express deception. As in the case
of an active misrepresentation, the marketplace absorbs the inaccuracy
that is based on the defendant's failure to disclose the inside informa-
209. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 244-50.
347
Washington Law Review
tion. When the plaintiff either buys or sells under the resulting inaccu-
rate presumptions of valuation, she suffers an economic injury
identical to the injury caused by an explicit lie. Because the gravamen
of a fraudulent scheme can be proven to exist simply by a showing of
an intentional act or omission of deception, trades on both inside
information and inside noninformation can be covered under the
fraudulent scheme cause of action.
2. The Effect of an Expanded Fraud on the Market Theory on
Elusive Abuses
Application of a reduced threshold deceptive scheme cause of action
would help deter credibility and noninformational trading, as well as
insider abstention from trading. By reducing the plaintiff's burden of
proof to a showing of an intentional deceptive scheme, we eliminate
both technical substantive requirements and some, but not all, eviden-
tiary barriers to liability. Those who intentionally trade on inside
credibility or noninformation would be liable despite the lack of fac-
tual knowledge upon which to pin a literal reading of fraud. The
reduced-threshold conception of a deceptive scheme recognizes that
trading on implicit information is conceptually indistinguishable from
trading on factual information, and that the crucial element of culpa-
bility should be deceptive intent rather than a spurious distinction
between factual information and noninformation.2 10 Applying the
fraud on the market theory to establish presumptive'ly the existence of
causation, reliance and injury would help ameliorate the difficulties of
proving noninformational fraud.21'
Regulation of insider abstention remains highly elusive, even if we
apply fraud on the market theory and a deceptive scheme cause of
action. One difficulty stems from the notion that while there may be
one or a few efficient causes of a decision to trade, there are potentially
an infinite number of reasons that a party abstains from trading. If
210. There is still a loophole here, but it is a smaller one. Those who receive a credibility tip
without knowledge of the inside information that serves as the tip's foundation would receive an
unfair advantage in market transactions but would be immune from liability due to lack of
scienter. A more stringent approach would be to remove insider trading liability from the
gravamen of fraud entirely, and require civil disgorgement of profits derived due to unfair
advantage, with or without scienter. One disadvantage to this stricter approach is the possibility
of creating "unjust disenrichment" for those who innocently rely upon their profits in making
future resource allocation decisions, and are subsequently required to cisgorge.
211. One significant evidentiary difficulty remains: proof of scienter regarding the tipper's
inside sources of credibility and intent to exploit noninformational inside advantage. It is more
difficult to infer intent from use of a noninformational tip than from an informational tip, as the
former requires an added step: proof that the defendant knew or had reason to know the




liability were attached to situations in which insiders abstained from
trading, insiders might actually feel compelled to enter disadvanta-
geous transactions which they would otherwise never have considered,
simply because they believe they might be held liable for exploitation
of that information in abstaining.2"
Even if such liability for abstention were theoretically tenable, diffi-
culties in proving causation to abstain from trading seem insurmount-
able. This is because the occurrence of a trade is the great exception,
whereas the millions of trades we never even consider are the rule of
default. It is virtually impossible, except in the rare instance in which
there is clear written or oral evidence of intent, to prove that absten-
tion from trading was caused by inside information. In fact, absten-
tion is generally not a decision at all, since the abstainer in most
instances never even considered making the trade at issue. For all
these reasons, while insider abstention remains ethically indistinguish-
able from insider trading, it also seems to elude effective regulation.
CONCLUSION
Credibility and noninformational insider trading, as well as insider
abstention, create real problems in the fair, effective, and thorough
regulation of parity of access to market information. The approach as
developed under rule lOb-5 restrains only a small fraction of ethically
and economically indistinguishable situations.
A number of exploratory solutions to this problem have been
addressed in the preceding section, all of which contain significant
flaws. Perhaps the most promising avenue for controlling noninfor-
mational trading is abandonment of common law fraud as the source
of insider liability, and the substitution of a "deceptive scheme" con-
cept supported by a liberal application of fraud on the market pre-
sumptions. Use of inside information in deciding to refrain from
trading appears to be singularly resilient against regulatory efforts.
Legal scholars in this area must continue to address limits in the
scope of our present regulatory system and problems associated with
inconsistent treatment of theoretically similar cases.213 Perhaps the
212. Such a result would be absurd. Fear that abstention from trading might lead to liability
for fraud would have a chilling effect on participation in securities markets, adding an intolerable
element of risk to the investment process.
213. Two levels of analysis will be particularly important in continuing to examine means of
establishing regulatory consistency: (1) development of theoretical bases to overcome the
limitations of the gravamen of fraud, as it fails to effect parity of access to market information,
and (2) examination of the difficulties of proof that create problems of both regulatory
surveillance and evidence for trial.
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most compelling threshold question concerns the test direction for
establishing consistency-movement toward greater legalization of
insider advantage, or movement toward more comprehensive regula-
tion of all such advantage. Whichever direction we choose, we must
adopt regulations that are both theoretically sound and internally con-
sistent. The challenge remains to find the best method of ensuring the
fairness, integrity and efficiency of securities markets without leaving
significant avenues for abuse.
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